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55 
Resolving Impact Investment Disputes:  
When Doing Good Goes Bad  
Deborah Burand

 
 “The world is on the brink of a revolution in how we solve 
society’s toughest problems. The force capable of driving this 
revolution is ‘social impact investing,’ which harnesses 
entrepreneurship, innovation and capital to power social 
improvement.” 
—Report of the independent Social Impact Investment 
Taskforce, established under the United Kingdom’s presidency 
of the G8 (September 15, 2014) 1  
 
  Deborah Burand is a clinical assistant professor at the University of Michigan Law 
School where she teaches in the area of impact investment lawyering and social 
entrepreneurship, and directs the International Transactions Clinic (ITC) that she co-founded in 
2008 at the University of Michigan Law School. She thanks her colleagues at the University of 
Michigan Law School, in particular Professor Julian Mortenson and adjunct faculty of the ITC, 
Donald Crane and Carl Valenstein; together with the generous participants at the New 
Directions in Community Lawyering, Social Entrepreneurship, and Dispute Resolution 
Scholarship Roundtable at Washington University School of Law, for their helpful comments, 
discussions, and suggestions on an early draft of this Article. 
 1. SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, IMPACT INVESTMENT: THE INVISIBLE 
HEART OF MARKETS 1 (2014) [hereinafter THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS]. The Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce was launched during the summer of 2013 as an independent task 
force under the United Kingdom’s presidency of the G8. Government and sector experts from 
the G7 countries, the European Commission, and Australia collaborated to report on “catalysing 
a global market in impact investment.” Id. The G8 Impact Taskforce Report is one of several 
papers and reports that were issued under this mandate. See also SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT 
TASKFORCE, POLICY LEVERS AND OBJECTIVES (2014); SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT 
TASKFORCE, MEASURING IMPACT (2014); SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, 
ALLOCATING FOR IMPACT (2014); SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, PROFIT-WITH-
PURPOSE BUSINESSES (2014); SOCIAL IMPACT INVESTMENT TASKFORCE, INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT (2014); Social Impact Investment Taskforce, GOV.UK, (Oct 19, 2014), available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/social-impact-investment-taskforce (listing eight 
National Advisory Board Reports—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States—notably absent is Russia). 
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“One might with justification say that [impact investing] brings 
the invisible heart of markets to guide their invisible hand.” 
—Sir Ronald Cohen, Chair of the Social Impact Taskforce, 
Letter to Leaders of Taskforce Governments2 
“This is ground zero of a big deal.” 
—Former US Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence Summers 
(May 2014)3  
INTRODUCTION 
A “revolution,” the “invisible heart of markets,” “ground zero of a 
big deal”—these are powerful metaphors for characterizing the 
promise of a new approach to investing money called “impact 
investing.”
4
 But can all impact investments deliver on these 
expectations?  
Most will deliver, but some may not. Accordingly, a challenge to 
growing a robust impact investment market is to make sure that the 
deals that fail to meet investors’ expectations don’t erode investor 
confidence in the impact investment market more generally.
5
 One 
 
 2. THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1. 
 3. See THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1, at 39 (Summers is quoted after 
investing in a new social finance innovation—the social impact bond). See also Burand, infra 
note 31 and accompanying text for further discussion of social impact bonds. 
 4. Even Pope Francis is promoting impact investing. In June 2014, he issued a call to 
action to world leaders, saying “[i]t is urgent that governments throughout the world commit 
themselves to developing an international framework capable of promoting a market of high 
impact investments and thus to combating an economy which excludes and discards.” THE 
INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1, at 39.  
 5. This Article focuses on how to respond to impact investments that do not meet 
investors’ expectations, that is impact investments that have “gone bad.” Most of the examples 
cited in this Article focus on impact investments that have failed to meet investors’ financial 
expectations, rather than those that have failed to meet investors’ social expectations.  
 Yet, in the impact investing market, investment disputes also can arise when there is 
financial or operational “over” performance by the impact investment, such that financial 
rewards are likely to overwhelm or distract managers’ attention from achieving social impact 
objectives. For example, the financial performance of a social enterprise may attract 
commercial investors that have little interest in the social mission of the enterprise. In some 
cases, notable financial success may make the social enterprise a target for acquisition by a 
larger commercial enterprise. Or, as happened in the microfinance sector, the financial rewards 
of conducting a lucrative initial public offering of a social enterprise may cause consternation 
among those who worry about subsequent mission drift. See, e.g., Muhammad Yunus, 
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way to ensure that this nascent market stays healthy as a whole, even 
if individual impact investments struggle, is to develop innovative 
and value-aligned approaches to dispute resolution that mirror the 
innovations and value alignment found in impact investment deal 
structures.  
This Article describes the state of impact investing today. In doing 
so, it examines trends in impact investment deal structures and 
documentation that distinguishes impact investments from more 
commercial investments. It also identifies unique challenges that may 
arise in disputes concerning weak or failing impact investments. To 
inform this discussion, this Article considers the responses of socially 
conscious investors to problems with their investments in troubled 
microfinance institutions shortly after the 2008 global recession. 
Finally, this Article considers the appropriateness of using 
international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in cross-
border, impact investments. This Article concludes with several 
suggestions for dispute resolution mechanisms that are capable of 
resolving disputes arising from impact investments gone bad. 
I. WHAT IS IMPACT INVESTING?  
While investing to advance societal goals is not a new idea, a 
market that self-identifies as impact investing only recently has 
emerged.
6
 The meaning of the term “impact investment” is not 
universally agreed upon. A growing consensus, however, recognizes 
that impact investing is more than investing with good intentions.
7
 
 
Sacrificing Microcredit for Megaprofits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/15/opinion/15yunus.html?_r=1 (Professor Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank and 
2006 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to creating the microfinance sector, 
criticizes the commercialization of microfinance and argues that “[p]overty should be 
eradicated, not seen as a money-making opportunity”). 
 6. The term “impact investing” was first coined in 2007 at a conference convened by the 
Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio, Italy. The use of financial investments to advance social 
goals has a much longer history, however. Some observers trace impact investing’s roots in the 
United States to 1950, when the United States started selling political risk insurance to US 
companies investing abroad. See U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD ON IMPACT INVESTING, 
PRIVATE CAPITAL, PUBLIC GOOD: HOW SMART FEDERAL POLICY CAN GALVANIZE IMPACT 
INVESTING—AND WHY IT’S URGENT 12 (2014). 
 7. Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investing Create Real Impact?, STAN. 
SOC. INNOV. REV. (Fall 2013) at 22 (with commentary by Audrey Choi, Morgan Stanley; 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:55 
 
 
Intentions matter, of course; but so does measurement of progress 
toward achieving those intentions. According to the G8’s Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce (the “Taskforce”), “the defining 
characteristic of impact investment is that the goal of generating 
financial returns is unequivocally pursued within the context of 
setting impact objectives and measuring their achievement.”
8
  
This Article adopts the definition of impact investment used by 
the Global Impact Investment Network (GIIN) in its 2013 survey of 
125 impact investors:
9
 “[i]mpact investments are investments made 
into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to 
generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial 
return. They can be made in both emerging and developed markets, 
and target a range of returns from below market to market rate, 
depending upon the circumstances.”
10
  
II. HOW BIG IS THE IMPACT INVESTING MARKET TODAY AND WHAT 
ARE ITS PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED GROWTH? 
As the quotes that introduced this Article indicate, some 
champions of impact investing see its potential power as nothing 
short of transformative, capable of mobilizing entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and capital to solve some of society’s most challenging 
 
Sterling Speirn, W.K. Kellogg Foundation; Alvaro Rodriguez Arregui & Michael Chu, IGNIA); 
see also OPIC In Action, OPIC, http://www.opic.gov/opic-action/impact-investing (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2014) (OPIC identifies deals as “impact investments” when its partners “. . . design 
their very business models with an explicit and inherent intent at startup to address 
environmental or social issues, as well as a business model with a structure dedicated to 
achieving both impact and financial returns”). 
 8. See THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1, at 18 (in contrast, an 
“investment that results in impact that is marginal to a business’s main activity is not impact 
investment, though it might be viewed as ‘investment with impact’”). 
 9. Yasemin Saltuk et al., Spotlight on the Market: The Impact Investor Survey, GLOBAL 
SOCIAL FINANCE (May 2, 2014), 1, 13 available at http://www.thegiin.org/binary-data/ 
2014MarketSpotlight.PDF (this survey gathered the responses of 125 impact investors at end of 
2013). Because this Article examines key findings of the GIIN survey, it adopts the GIIN 
definition of impact investing. 
 10. Id. at 13; see also About Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK 
(GIIN) (2014), http://www.thegiin.org/cgibin/iowa/resources/about/index.html. GIIN identifies 
four core characteristics of impact investing: (1) intentionality, (2) investment with return 
expectations, (3) range of return expectations and asset classes, and (4) impact measurement. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  When Doing Good Goes Bad 59 
 
 
problems.
11
 Whether impact investing can live up to its promise, 
however, is likely to turn on whether impact investments actually 
deliver on their multiple bottom lines—that is, their ability to deliver 
financial returns alongside measurable progress toward desired social 
and environmental impacts.
12
  
Many market observers are betting that impact investments will 
do just that, as shown by the fast growth rate of capital investment in 
the impact investing market. A recent survey of 125 impact investors 
found that these investors managed approximately $46 billion in 
impact investment assets as of the end of 2013.
13
 Survey respondents 
also reported that they planned to invest another $12.7 billion in 
2014, while increasing the number of impact investment transactions 
executed in 2014 by 31 percent.
14
  
Whether this pace of growth can and will continue is debatable. 
Current impact investors point to the following challenges to growing 
their portfolios of impact investments:  
1.  Shortage of high quality investment opportunities with 
track records 
2.  Lack of appropriate capital across the risk/return spectrum 
3.  Difficulty exiting impact investments  
 
 11. See THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1, at 1 (“By bringing a third 
dimension, impact, to the 20th century capital market dimensions of risk and return, impact 
investing has the potential to transform our ability to build a better society for all”). 
 12. John Elkington coined the term “triple bottom line” when describing the financial, 
social and environmental bottom lines of companies. See, e.g., JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS 
WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1997).  
 13. See Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 5–6 (surveyed respondents providing numerical data 
for 2013 and 2012 experienced 10 percent growth in capital committed between 2012 and 2013 
and 20 percent growth in the number of deals executed).  
 Impact investing is taking place across a range of sectors, but the majority of impact 
investing is currently concentrated in the financial services sector, including both microfinance 
(21 percent) and other types of financial services (21 percent). See Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 
7. This sectoral allocation may start to shift. A number of survey respondents indicated that they 
plan to increase their sector exposure to food and agriculture and to healthcare. Id.  
 14. Id. at 12–13 (surveyed respondents committed $10.6 billion and executed 4,914 deals 
in 2013. In 2014, they expect to invest another $12.7 billion and execute another 6,419 deals).  
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4.  Lack of innovative deal/fund structures to accommodate 
investors’ or portfolio companies’ needs 
5.  Lack of common way to talk about impact investing
15
 
These are significant concerns that deserve attention and creative 
solutions, but it should be noted that these are the concerns of a 
relatively small number of investors (125) that are already active in 
the impact investment market.  
The real challenge here is convincing a much larger class of 
investors to enter the impact investment market, namely those 1,276 
investment managers that currently manage more than $45 trillion in 
assets and have committed to incorporate social, environmental, and 
governance factors into their investment decisions.
16
 To convince 
these investment managers to direct some portion of the assets under 
their management to the impact investing market, work needs to be 
done to ensure that any weak or failing impact investments are dealt 
with efficiently and effectively. Otherwise, disappointments over the 
performance of a handful of impact investments may spill over and 
taint these investment managers’ view of the quality of the rest of the 
impact investing market.  
III. WHAT KINDS OF DEALS ARE BEING DONE IN IMPACT INVESTING 
AND HOW ARE THESE TRANSACTIONS DIFFERENT FROM MORE 
TRADITIONAL COMMERCIAL INVESTMENTS? 
Currently, more than two-thirds of impact investing deal flow 
takes place in emerging markets outside the United States. Much of 
that deal flow is in the form of debt financing.
17
 Therefore, as a 
 
 15. Id. at 17.  
 16. See THE INVISIBLE HEART OF MARKETS, supra note 1, at 18.  
 17. See Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 6–7, 23 (debt financing accounts for 62 percent of 
the impact investment assets currently under management, and private equity investments 
amount to 24 percent).  
 This current preference for debt financing may reflect one of the concerns identified by 
impact investors in the Impact Investor Survey—namely, it is difficult to exit an impact 
investment. Id. at 6, tbl.4 (difficulty of exiting investments ranked in the top three of perceived 
challenges to the growth of the impact investing market). The lack of exit options, in turn, can 
place additional pressure on parties trying to resolve an impact investment dispute since it is 
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general matter, the documentation of an impact investment will look 
very familiar to those experienced in structuring more traditional, 
cross-border commercial investments, particularly international debt 
financings.  
Some impact investors, however, have developed new forms of 
documentation and deal structures that attempt to align their capital to 
the business models, including financial and social objectives, of 
their investees. As one impact investor has commented, “[t]he bottom 
line is that impact is being generated by the underlying operating 
entity. As investors, our job is to understand the underlying business 
model and determine whether we are prepared to align our capital to 
support it.”
18
  
A recent study of the innovative deal structures currently used in 
impact investments observed that both debt and equity investors
19
 are 
modifying and adapting traditional deal structures to align the timing 
and amount of financial returns with the business models of their 
borrowers/investees.
20
 Some lenders offer borrowers more flexible 
 
unlikely that a disgruntled investor can walk away from a dispute by simply selling its impact 
investment to another party.  
 18. Id. at 13.  
 19. Grant funders also are experimenting with new hybrid structures. For example, some 
donors are developing “repayable grant” facilities that, upon the occurrence of certain agreed 
milestones (often operational or financial targets), convert their grants into loans that the grant 
recipient is expected to repay to the donor. This structure may appear counterintuitive as it 
effectively penalizes high-achieving grant recipients by introducing a financial liability to 
replace what originally was “free” money. This structure could also introduce an element of 
moral hazard such that grant recipients have a financial incentive not to meet the agreed 
milestones. The donors proposing these structures, however, appear willing to accept the risks 
inherent in this misalignment of incentives. Some critics might argue that grant recipients that 
meet certain operational or financial threshold indicators of success can afford to return the 
grant funding. Recycling these donor funds back to the donors, they argue, benefits all impact 
investment stakeholders, since relatively scarce grant resources can then made available to other 
grant recipients. Examples of repayable grants are available in the author’s clinic files; see also 
“conditionally repayable contributions” offered by the Canadian government to small 
businesses (conditions for these repayable contributions are described at http://www.canada 
governmentgrants.org/conditionally-repayable-contribution.php); repayable grants also are 
offered by the Global Water Foundation to small and medium enterprises and local 
entrepreneurs. See Grant Guidelines, GLOBAL WATER FOUND. http://www.globalwater 
foundation.org/index.php?page=grant (last visited June 10, 2015). 
 20. Diana Propper de Callejon et al., Innovative Deal Structures for Impact Investments 
(2014) (report) (on file with author). This study, Innovative Deal Structures for Impact 
Investments, is based on interviews with nearly one hundred impact investors, enterprises, legal 
experts, and advisors from around the world. Its key findings, which were released in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:55 
 
 
repayment schedules. For example, they are creating variable 
payment structures that are triggered when (and in some cases, only 
if) the borrower meets certain thresholds of revenues or cash flows. 
Therefore, the timing and amount of debt repayments are contingent 
on the borrower’s financial performance rather than a traditional, 
fixed payment schedule.
21
 Other lenders are providing for principal 
amortization schedules that go for as long as ten years or grace 
periods of eighteen to twenty-four months or more; some lenders are 
agreeing to forego prepayment penalties or, in a few cases, offer 
prepayment discounts.
22
  
Equity investors also are attempting to align the timing and 
amount of dividend payments and redemption rights with the 
business models of their investees. In doing so, they stage dividend 
payments and redemption-based exits, and, in some cases, link these 
payments to the investee’s revenues or amount of cash on hand.
23
  
Beyond aligning impact investors’ financial return expectations to 
the investee’s business model, some impact investors also attempt to 
embed social impact goals directly into the contractual provisions of 
their investments. These provisions could aim to protect against 
 
September 2014, focus on privately held, early-stage businesses. The lead researchers were 
Diana Propper de Callejon and Bruce Campbell, with support from Gabi Blumberg. Id. 
 21. See id. One variable payment structure used by impact investors is called the “demand 
dividend.” The demand dividend structure, it should be noted, does not offer dividends to its 
investors. Rather, the demand dividend is a variation on debt royalty structures and often 
includes the following features: (1) a payment schedule that is tied to the cash flow of the 
borrower, (2) a honeymoon period (grace period) where repayment obligations are deferred, 
(3) a fixed payment obligation that is calculated as a multiple of the amount lent to the 
borrower, and (4) covenants focused on ensuring that the borrower reaches a positive cash flow. 
See SANTA CLARA UNIV., DEMAND DIVIDEND: CREATING RELIABLE RETURNS IN IMPACT 
INVESTING 3 (June 2013), available at http://www.scu.edu/socialbenefit/impact-capital/upload/ 
Demand-Dividend-Description.pdf. 
 22. See Propper de Callejon, supra note 20, at 3. 
 23. See id. at 2. 
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unintended and undesirable social impacts or,
24
 conversely, to spur 
and measure desired social impacts.
25
  
Other impact investors, however, do not appear to rely (or at least 
not as much) on contractual provisions in their investment 
documentation to ensure mission compliance.
26
 Instead, these 
 
 24. SARAH FORSTER ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES: A 
TECHNICAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 15–16 (Nov. 2010). The German-owned, development 
finance institution, KfW, uses a contractual provision when making loans to microfinance 
institutions that aims to minimize adverse impacts on the end-users of its funding. More 
specifically, this contractual provision attempts to ensure that the microfinance institutions 
receiving loans from KfW adopt adequate customer protections for the micro-entrepreneurs that 
they serve. It states:  
The Borrower [microfinance institution] shall fully comply with all existing and future 
national laws and regulations on consumer protection especially in the area of financial 
services. The Borrower shall in particular provide its customers with clear and 
comprehensive information on the main characteristics of the financial services the 
customers [micro-entrepreneurs] seek. The Borrower shall, for example, have 
thoroughly informed its customers in good time before the signing of a loan agreement 
on the terms and conditions of the loan in a way easily understandable for the 
customer.  
 These loan agreements shall further contain such information and shall be drafted in 
a manner the customers are able to understand. Furthermore, the Borrower shall 
critically review the customer’s repayment capacities before signing a loan agreement 
and shall refrain from any form of unfair or even harmful debt collection practices. 
Id. at 16. While some investors have included clauses like the above that require financial 
institutions to assess the repayment capacity of micro-entrepreneurs in both their loan and 
equity documentation, other investors have opted not to include such clauses in their investment 
documentation, and, instead, are focusing efforts on working with investees to improve client 
protection practices. See id. at 15–16. 
 25. Typically these contractual provisions are put in the form of reporting covenants, 
which require the investee to report to its funders on the social impact of its operations and 
activities. In the microfinance context, where financial inclusion is the desired social impact, 
these covenants can take the form of reporting provisions relating to the number of poor clients 
in rural areas or the number of female micro-entrepreneurs being served, for example. See 
generally Richard Rosenberg, Measuring Results of Microfinance Institutions: Minimum 
Indicators That Donors and Investors Should Track, CGAP, (June 2009), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Technical-Guide-Measuring-Results-of-Micro 
finance-Institutions-Minimum-Indicators-That-Donors-and-Investors-Should-Track-Jul-2009.pdf).  
 26. In 2013/2014, students of the ITC conducted a survey of impact investors to determine 
the extent to which impact investors are using contractual provisions in their investment 
documentation to ensure compliance with social mission goals. Christina M. Culver & Feihong 
Xu, University of Michigan International Transactions Clinic, Reinforcing Social Mission 
Through Redemption Clauses: A Survey of Industry Standards (2014) (unpublished survey) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Reinforcing Social Mission Survey]. More specifically, students 
interviewed half a dozen impact investors with active equity investments to find out whether 
these impact investors used contractual provisions, such as redemption clauses, to encourage 
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investors use the pre-investment, due diligence process to assess the 
seriousness of the potential investee’s commitment to achieving 
targeted social objectives. Once the investment is made, these impact 
investors rely on investees’ governance structures to police the 
monitoring of, and compliance with, their investees’ social mission 
goals.
27
 
Another factor that some impact investors leverage to shape 
investee behavior is the prospect, or lack thereof, of future funding. 
Some impact investors have indicated that they are unlikely to 
contribute future, additional funding to any investees that materially 
deviate from their stated social missions.
28
 The effectiveness of such 
a threat to withhold future investments is likely to turn on the extent 
to which other sources of attractive capital present themselves to the 
investee.  
Other ways that impact is being embedded in deal structures and 
investment documentation include the following: 
1. A social mission definition is included in the deal 
documentation;
29
 
2. The use of proceeds of the investment are restricted to 
financing those business operations that are driving social 
impact outcomes;
30
 
3. The investee’s governance structure includes the 
appointment of a board member with the responsibility to 
oversee the investee’s social impact;
31
 
 
investees’ compliance with stated social mission goals. Id. at 2. Among the surveyed impact 
investors, only a few expressly tied social mission compliance to redemption rights. Id. at 2. 
Furthermore, rarely (if ever) are such redemption rights actually used to accelerate an exit. Id. at 
2. Rather, those surveyed investors that link social mission to redemption rights appear to be 
using such rights as leverage to bring the investees to the negotiating table, while also signaling 
to investees (as well as to other investors, presumably) that social mission compliance is a 
priority. Id. at 3.  
 27. Id. at 4.  
 28. Id. at 2–3.  
 29. See Propper de Callejon, supra note 19, at 3.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
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4. Financial returns are correlated to social impact outcomes 
actually achieved by the investee—either directly (the higher 
the social impact, the higher the expected financial return)
32
 or 
inversely (a lower financial return is required if a higher social 
impact return is achieved); or  
5. Investors are seeking to preserve the social mission 
objectives of their investees, even at exit.
33
  
In this author’s opinion, this last issue presents some of the thorniest, 
and perhaps most controversial, deal structures and clauses in impact 
investing. A variety of methods have attempted to preserve social 
mission, a goal sometimes called “mission lock,” beyond the 
contractual terms of the impact investment. In some cases, the 
investee’s founders—presumably the people and/or institutions most 
concerned with maintaining control of the investee’s social mission—
are granted veto power to block investor exits that conflict with that 
mission.
34
  
In other cases, mission lock is being attempted through the 
investee’s choice of legal form and/or charter provisions. Several 
relatively new legal forms of corporate entities are emerging in the 
United States and elsewhere that can be utilized by organizations 
seeking to generate financial returns as well as positive social and/or 
environmental benefits.
35
 Organizations’ motivations for choosing 
 
 32. Id. In the case of a new social finance innovation, social impact bonds (SIBs), 
financial and social returns are correlated positively so that financial returns increase when 
targeted social outcomes are met or exceeded. See generally Deborah Burand, Globalizing 
Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and Social Impact Performance Guarantees Can 
Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447 (2013) (describing two of the first SIB 
structures).  
 33. See Propper de Callejon, supra note 20, at 3. 
 34. Id. The termination of valuable licenses or hikes in the royalties/fees to be paid for 
such licenses also are reportedly being used by some to deter social mission drift (or at the very 
least, make such a drift more “painful”).  
 35. One new legal form in the United States is the “benefit corporation.” Adopted first in 
Maryland in 2010, twenty-seven states have enacted benefit corporation legislation to date. 
Notably, among these states, Delaware enacted public benefit corporation legislation in 2013. 
Alicia Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 248 (2014). 
 Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. recently offered an analysis of the 
potential implications of Delaware’s decision to adopt public benefit corporation legislation. In 
his opinion, Delaware’s decision to permit a new legal form of company—the public benefit 
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one of these legal forms can be mixed. In some cases, it appears that 
this legal formation decision is being made by the founders. In other 
cases, impact investors also may be pushing the organization to 
incorporate as one of these new legal forms.  
One’s choice of legal entity, however, is not the only way to 
achieve mission lock. Some organizations are including mission 
locks in their charter documents.
36
 It remains to be seen whether 
 
corporation—is of particular significance because Delaware is the state of incorporation for the 
majority of American public companies and the preferred domicile for American companies 
seeking to go public. Consequently, he predicts that benefit corporations that hope to go public 
are likely to domicile in Delaware. Relatedly, Chief Justic Strine observes that one of the most 
important consequences of Delaware’s public benefit corporation legislation is that the Revlon 
doctrine is not applicable to public benefit corporations. Consequently, the board’s duty in a 
sale of control is fundamentally changed: namely, the board of a public benefit corporation 
cannot simply sell the corporation to highest bidder, but must use its own judgment to choose 
the best offer after considering all corporate constituencies. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier 
for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 243–45 (2014).  
 In addition to benefit corporation legislation, some states have enacted laws that allow 
other legal forms of enterprises that expressly contemplate a social mission, such as “flexible 
purpose” or “social purpose” corporations (California and Washington, respectively), and “low 
profit, limited liability companies” (L3Cs). See generally J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms 
of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15, 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988556. Nine states have enacted L3C legislation, but North Carolina 
repealed its L3C legislation effective January 2014. As of August 24, 2014, over one thousand 
L3Cs have been formed in the United States. Latest LC3 Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS L3C, 
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  
 This is happening outside the United States too. For example, the “community interest 
company” is a relatively new legal form in the United Kingdom. Introduced in 2005, 
community interest companies now number over ten thousand. See generally THE OFFICE OF 
THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, OPERATIONAL REPORT: SECOND 
QUARTER 2014–2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/365907/CIC-14-1163-community-interest-companies-operational-report-
second-quarter-2014-15.pdf.  
 36. In 2013 the ITC provided pro bono legal support to help a L3C convert into a more 
traditional C Corporation at the request of an investor, but expressly included a broad social 
purpose in the Articles of Incorporation similar to that found in the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation (“Model Legislation”) (originally drafted by Bill Clark of Drinker, Biddle, & Reath 
LLP, the Model Legislation has evolved. A current version (June 2014) of the Model 
Legislation can be found at http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation.).  
 More specifically, the Articles include a provision stating: 
The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is formed are to engage in any 
activity within the purposes for which corporations may be formed under the Michigan 
Business Corporation Act, including, without limitation, creating a (i) general public 
benefit, meaning a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of the 
corporation, and (ii) the specific public benefits of improving human health and 
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these mission locks will prove effective.
37
 Similarly, it remains to be 
seen whether those investors that achieve an effective mission lock 
will be satisfied in the long term with the social performance of their 
investee, particularly if the mission lock limits the investee’s ability 
to innovate or attract additional capital needed to scale its operations.  
IV. WHAT RISKS DO IMPACT INVESTMENTS PRESENT AND HOW ARE 
THEY CURRENTLY PERFORMING? WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN IMPACT 
INVESTMENT GOES BAD?  
For the second year in a row, “[b]usiness model execution [and] 
management risk” top the list of impact investors’ concerns as to the 
most significant contributors to risk in their impact investment 
 
providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services. 
See Design Innovations for Infants and Mothers Everywhere (DIIME), Articles of Incorporation 
(Apr. 23, 2013) (on file with author).  
 Some companies are including provisions in their charter documents that specify what they 
will not do to make profits. A notable and recent example is Ello.co, an ad-free social media 
network that converted to a Delaware public benefit corporation in the fall of 2014. Its new 
charter states, in part, that: 
 Ello shall not for pecuniary gain: 
1. Sell user-specific data to a third party; 
2. Enter into an agreement to display paid advertising on behalf of a third party; and  
3. In the event of an acquisition or asset transfer, the Company shall require any 
acquiring entity to adopt these requirements with respect to the operations of Ello or its 
assets. 
Jonathan Shieber, Ello Raises $5.5 Million, Legally Files As Public Benefit Corp. Meaning No 
Ads Ever, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 23, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/23/ello-raises-5-5-
million-legally-files-as-public-benefit-corp-meaning-no-ads-ever/ (emphasis added) (reproducing 
Oct. 20, 2014 memorandum executed by founders and current investors of Ello).  
 37. One practical but not particularly easy way that charter provisions of benefit 
corporations can be “unlocked” is through a vote of the requisite number of 
shareholders/members. For example, under the model benefit corporation legislation, 
shareholders can vote to terminate benefit corporation status by a two-thirds supermajority vote. 
Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 105(a) (2013); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 363(c)(1) 
(dilution or change of public benefit corporation’s commitment to pursue a public benefit must 
be approved by two-thirds of outstanding shares); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 363(c)(2) 
(public benefit corporation cannot merge or consolidate with another entity if, as result of such 
merger or consolidation, the surviving corporation’s certificate of incorporation lacks identical 
provisions identifying public benefit, unless the merger or consolidation transaction received 
approval of two-thirds of outstanding shares of the public benefit corporation).  
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portfolios.
38
 To combat this concern, most impact investment capital 
(89 percent) has gone to companies that are in a post-venture stage, 
and hence have a proven track record of performance.
39
 A much 
smaller amount of impact investment capital (11 percent) has been 
invested to date in seed, start-up, or venture stage enterprises.
40
 As 
impact investors start to invest in less proven enterprises, the chances 
of underperformance—both in terms of social impact and financial 
expectations—are likely to increase.
41
 
 
 38. Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 34 (other contributors to the risk of impact investment 
portfolios, in descending order of concern to surveyed impact investors, include: liquidity and 
exit risk; market demand and competition risk; country and currency risk; macroeconomic risk; 
financing risk; and perception and reputational risk); see also Paul Brest & Kelly Born, supra 
note 7, at 29 (according to Alvaro Rodriguez Arregui and Michael Chu, impact investors have a 
higher tolerance for risk than do traditional investors). 
 39. Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 7 (35 percent growth stage, 44 percent mature and 
privately held, and 10 percent mature and publicly traded).  
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., David Bank, E+Co Avoids Litigation—Barely—and Emerges Persistent, 
HUFFINGTION POST BLOG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bank/eco-
avoids-liquidation-ba_b_1932503.html. This was, at least in part, a challenge faced by the now 
defunct E+Co, which provided capital and technical assistance to sustainable energy 
entrepreneurs in Central America, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to co-
founder Christine Eibs Singer, E+Co’s portfolio of investments faced challenges due to a 
mismatch between the increasing amount of capital that E+Co could tap to finance small and 
growing businesses and the diminishing amount of grants and other funding available to E+Co 
to provide technical assistance to those same investees. She is quoted in the press, saying, “[t]he 
portfolio had grown in volume, but it was a lot of startup entrepreneurs and they needed hand-
holding. The challenge is how do you fund the technical assistance to de-risk these 
investments?” Id. 
 In 2012, E+Co faced a restructuring of its investment portfolio and winding up of 
operations. Nearly half of the E+Co portfolio was written off or down. The remaining portfolio 
was transferred to private equity funds in debt-for-equity exchanges. Id.; see also Scott 
Anderson, Weekly Roundup: E+Co’s Slow Burn and What it Means for Impact Investing, NEXT 
BILLION (Oct. 13, 2012), http://nextbillion.net/blogspot.aspx?blogid=2977. According to 
Anderson, E+Co’s experience “raises questions beyond management, governance, due 
diligence, and investment squabbles.” Id. Given that E+Co was viewed as a trailblazer and, 
prior to its demise, a success story in impact investing, Anderson asks what is an appropriate 
fund model for impact investing, how many boards/investors understand the risks to their 
capital when they invest in impact investment funds, and “how many truly understand (and are 
comfortable with) what patient capital means in practice?” Id.  
 Over two years later, the wind-up of E+Co is still discussed within the impact investing 
community as observers look for lessons to take away from this experience. In May 2014, Scott 
Anderson returned to this story in an interview with Christopher Aidun, CEO and Managing 
Director of Persistent Energy Partners, the company that acquired E+Co’s Africa portfolio of 
investments as part of E+Co’s restructuring plan. Prior to his current leadership roles at 
Persistent Energy Partners, Mr. Aidun served as the managing director of E+Co. At E+Co, Mr. 
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Most impact investors, however, report that their impact 
investment portfolios currently perform in line with their social 
impact and financial return expectations.
42
 What is more, a sizeable 
number of impact investments are exceeding their investors’ 
expectations.
43
 Where there have been disappointing results, these are 
 
Aidun helped negotiate the debt restructuring plan with key E+Co creditors, which led to 
E+Co’s asset transfer of its African portfolio to Persistent Energy Partners, the for-profit 
company co-founded by Mr. Aidun. Scott Anderson, A Renewable Proposition (Part 1): 
Formerly E+Co, Persistent Energy Partners Looks to Solar Horizon, NEXT BILLION (May 20, 
2014), http://nextbillion.net/blogpost.aspx?blogid=3885. According to Mr. Aidun, the reason 
that E+Co’s business model did not work was due to the number and size of the deals it was 
making: 
Managing a large number of small investments [most of E+Co’s investments ranged 
from $200,000 to $250,000] requires at least as much attention as managing a large 
number of large investments. In fact, investing in small entrepreneurs in developing 
markets means that even greater investment management effort is required per 
investment. E+Co didn’t earn enough in management fees and grants to support the 
size of investment staff needed to manage its portfolio. So even with all the 
sophistication of a private equity fund, E+Co was doomed. 
Id. Audrey Desiderato, co-founder and COO of SunFunder, a solar finance company, draws 
different lessons from the E+Co experience. After disclosing that one of the founders of E+Co 
was an important mentor of hers, Ms. Desiderato identifies five lessons to be gleaned from 
E+Co’s demise: (1) start with a for-profit model; (2) create investment products and processes 
and harness technologies aimed at dealing with the fact that many of the target portfolio 
companies for investment cannot furnish investors ideal levels of financial and customer data; 
(3) stay in physical proximity to investments to observe their operations; (4) create a financial 
eco-system that graduates target portfolio companies from one source of capital to another and 
fosters investor coordination (rather than competition); and (5) match funding sources’ 
expectations to target portfolio companies’ risk profiles; match the skills and talents of board, 
staff, and advisors to the investing entity’s business model; and ensure that all involved 
understand mission goals. Audrey Desiderato, What Can SunFunder Learn from E+Co, 
SUNFINDER (July 24, 2014), http://blog.sunfunder.com/post/92753292356/what-can-sunfunder-
learn-from-e-co.  
 42. Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 31. Note that while the return expectations of impact 
investors can vary greatly, most impact investors expect some amount of a financial return. Id. 
at 13 (80 percent of surveyed investors think it is “essential” that impact investments generate 
financial returns). Some impact investors are “financial first” oriented, meaning that they seek 
to optimize financial returns provided a base threshold of social returns is met. Others are 
“impact first” investors; they seek to optimize social returns provided a base threshold of 
financial returns is met. Others fall somewhere in between. JESSICA FREIREICH & KATHERINE 
FULTON, INVESTING FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR 
CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 31–32 (2009) (identifies categories of impact 
investors based on the investors’ primary investment motivations).  
 43. Of this group, 20 percent report that their investments are outperforming against their 
social impact expectations, and 16 percent report outperformance against their financial return 
expectations. Saltuk et al., supra note 9, at 31. 
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more often due to financial underperformance than to social impact 
underperformance.
44
  
This is not to suggest, however, that impact investing is immune 
to performance problems, financial or otherwise.
45
 The most notable 
example of what can go wrong in impact investing can be found in 
the microfinance sector, which currently accounts for slightly more 
than one-fifth of the impact investment market.
46
 The microfinance 
sector faced serious refinancing challenges when the 2008 financial 
downturn constrained liquidity on a global scale. While the number 
of microfinance institutions that defaulted as a result of this liquidity 
crunch was not as large as some (including this author) feared,
47
 
some microfinance investors unhappily found themselves in the 
middle of negotiating and structuring debt workouts for troubled 
microfinance institutions.
48
  
A 2009–2010 study of seventeen microfinance debt workouts 
(sixteen microfinance institutions and one regional microfinance 
investment fund) found a variety of reasons for the failures that led to 
these workouts.
49
 In most cases, microcredit portfolio deterioration 
was the proximate cause of the problem. Other factors, however, such 
as weak management and governance within the microfinance 
institutions, adverse macroeconomic conditions, and difficult political 
environments also contributed to performance problems.
50
 In two 
cases, investors identified fraud in the microfinance institutions.
51
 Of 
particular relevance to this discussion, however, is how these 
 
 44. Only 1 percent reported underperformance on social impact, while 9 percent reported 
financial underperformance relative to expectations. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra note 12. 
 47. See Deborah Burand, Deleveraging Microfinance: Principles for Managing Voluntary 
Debt Workouts of Microfinance Institutions, 27 J.L. & COM. 193, 199–200 (2009).  
 48. See, e.g., INTERNAT’L ASSOC. OF MICROFIN. INVESTORS, MICROFIN. LENDERS 
WORKING GROUP, AND MORGAN STANLEY, CHARTING THE COURSE: BEST PRACTICES 
AND TOOLS FOR VOLUNTARY DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS IN MICROFINANCE (2011), available 
at http://www.morganstanley.com/globalcitizen/pdf/IAMFI.pdf [hereinafter INTERNAT’L ASSOC. 
OF MICROFIN. INVESTORS] (approximately six percent of the loans made by microfinance 
investment intermediaries required restructuring during this period). 
 49. Id. at 5 (approximately 6 percent of the loans made by microfinance investment 
intermediaries required restructuring during this period).  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  When Doing Good Goes Bad 71 
 
 
microfinance investors behaved toward the troubled investee, and 
toward each other, when confronted with investments going bad.  
One key finding is that the diversity of lenders to these 
microfinance institutions made debt workouts especially challenging. 
Microfinance, like much of impact investing, has attracted investors 
with a wide range of investment motivations and return 
expectations.
52
 The sheer number of lenders with loans outstanding to 
a single microfinance institution complicated some of these 
workouts.
53
 Additionally, the lenders often were quite diverse with 
respect to their risk tolerances, sources of funding, legal mandates 
(e.g., some were not legally authorized to receive equity stakes in 
return for troubled debt assets), and deliberative processes.
54
 Taken 
together, this diversity slowed the workouts, sometimes to the 
detriment of the troubled microfinance institution that needed a fast 
resolution of its debt problems.  
The microfinance institutions, however, were not the only ones 
who suffered from the diverse range of interests evidenced by the 
lenders. Some intercreditor relationships suffered as well. As one 
representative of a microfinance investment fund tellingly observed: 
“To those who take the money and run . . . people don’t forget. 
Behavior comes back to haunt you.”
55
 Another key finding was that, 
while social objectives mattered, investors’ perceived fiduciary 
responsibilities to their own sources of capital sometimes led them to 
prioritize capital protection over advancement of the investee’s social 
mission.
56
 One representative of a microfinance investment 
intermediary framed this tension as follows: “We are continuing to 
 
 52. See discussion of varying investor expectation supra note 42. 
 53. One representative of a microfinance investment fund observed that organizing a large 
group of lenders was like “herding cats.” INTERNAT’L ASSOC. OF MICROFIN. INVESTORS, 
supra note 48, at 7.  
 54. Id. at 7–8. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 7–8. Socially-motivated lenders noted that, like more commercial lenders, they 
too had fiduciary responsibilities to their stakeholders and that the repayment of their 
outstanding loans to microfinance institutions was necessary to support the financing of future 
investments. As a result, in some cases, some socially-motivated lenders soundly rejected any 
workout scenario that would have provided them with restructuring terms that were less 
favorable from a financial standpoint than those offered to more commercially-oriented co-
lenders. 
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learn as a social investor what the balance is in protecting investors’ 
capital and being patient capital.”
57
  
A third, perhaps not surprising, finding is that investors that have 
gone through a workout are changed as a result of that experience and 
may approach new investments and potential co-lenders with more 
caution and suspicion. For example, some investors that participated 
in microfinance debt workouts subsequently decided to engage more 
rigorous due diligence processes in hopes of avoiding another 
workout situation.
58
 Others concluded that their standard loan 
agreements contained flaws that weakened investor claims on the 
borrower, particularly vis-à-vis other lenders. These investors, 
therefore, decided to take steps to improve their loan documentation 
and processes, including making better (or, for some, any) use of 
local counsel to enforce legal claims on borrowers’ assets.
59
 Still 
others considered adding new covenants to their loan agreements that 
would attempt to shape a troubled borrower’s behavior toward its 
investors
60
 and penalize or forestall any preferential treatment by the 
borrower of some lenders over others.
61
  
 
 57. Id. at 7.  
 58. Id. at 17 (Microfinance investors determined to strengthen “their due diligence, loan 
documentation, monitoring and restructuring capabilities.”).  
 59. Id. at 9, 17.  
 60. Id. at 39. For example, some lenders determined that, in the future if a borrowing 
microfinance institution became distressed, they would propose that all lenders to that 
microfinance institution should amend their loan documentation so as standardize the timing 
and content of the reports and notices required of the borrower. This would ensure that 
information was shared equally among all lenders and no lender would benefit from getting 
borrower information faster than others. This standardization also would make it easier for the 
troubled MFI since it would no longer bear the administrative burden of meeting multiple 
reporting requirements.  
 61. Id. at 33–39. For example, some lenders involved in these microfinance workouts later 
proposed adding a negative covenant to their loan documentation that would prohibit any early 
redemption or prepayment by a troubled microfinance institution of its debt obligations. This 
covenant was intended in part to preserve the microfinance’s net cash flow. It was also intended 
to protect lenders who had provided borrower-friendly financial terms and conditions from 
being disadvantaged should the borrower try to first prepay its more onerous debt obligations to 
others. Id. at 39. The irony here is that some borrowers with limited cash on hand paid down 
their more expensive commercial debt obligations at the expense of servicing cheaper debt 
obligations to more socially-motivated lenders. While a wholly rational decision from the point 
of view of the borrower, this practice did not sit well with disadvantaged lenders. More 
specifically, some “social impact first” lenders made it clear that they were “unwilling to 
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A fourth finding is that investors were likely to try, at least at the 
outset, managing disputes in a coordinated and consensual fashion 
outside of more formal mechanisms such as litigation or bankruptcy 
proceedings.
62
 Lenders, however, often were slow to form 
intercreditor committees to engage collectively with the troubled 
borrower, 
63
 and, as a result, lost valuable time that could have been 
spent responding to the weakening financial positions of the 
microfinance institution.
64
 In part, these delays may have been due to 
the relative inexperience in managing debt workouts of some of the 
individuals involved.
65
  
 
assume a de facto subordinated position or outcome relative to other [more commercially-
oriented] investors.” Id. at 7–8. 
 62. Id. at 10. Because of concerns about the lack of clear-cut bankruptcy laws in the 
emerging markets where these troubled MFIs were operating, and worries that forced 
liquidation strategies could backfire “given the challenge in servicing microloans and the 
likelihood that client repayment [would] plummet once an MFI’s imminent closure [became] 
public,” lenders involved in these microfinance workouts generally preferred to pursue 
voluntary restructurings. 
 63. Id. at 7. In nearly all cases, lenders formed intercreditor committees to engage with the 
troubled microfinance institution; but, there were numerous instances where lenders did not 
respond with sufficient urgency or had problems forming a lender group that was able to 
negotiate collectively and present a unified position in negotiations with the borrower.  
 64. Id. Only a small number of the creditor committees entered into formal intercreditor or 
standstill agreements. Id. at 7.  
 65. Id. at 8 (microfinance investment intermediaries involved in these workouts had 
“almost no staff members in their microfinance investment departments with prior debt workout 
experience”). 
 To respond to this challenge and help the microfinance sector as a whole learn from these 
voluntary debt workout experiences, a working group of investors in microfinance (organized 
under the auspices of IAMFI) secured the pro bono services of the ITC during the 2009–2010 
academic year to produce four tools to facilitate smoother debt workouts of microfinance 
institutions in the future.  
 One product was the development of Microfinance Voluntary Debt Workout Principles 
(“Microfinance Workout Principles”). The Microfinance Workout Principles were informed by 
guidelines applied to negotiations of commercially-oriented, cross-border debt workouts in the 
financial sector, such as those developed by the International Federation of Insolvency 
Professionals (INSOL). See, e.g., INSOL, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL 
APPROACH TO MULTI-CREDITOR WORKOUTS (2000), available at http://www.insol.org/pdf/ 
Lenders.pdf. The Microfinance Workout Principles draw on these guidelines, but then were 
adapted to respond to the unique characteristics of microfinance and investors in microfinance. 
See INTERNAT’L ASSOC. OF MICROFIN. INVESTORS, supra note 48, at 21–24. 
 Another product was the development of an Intercreditor Agreement Template to guide 
investors in creating ex post intercreditor agreements. See id. app. 5, at 25–31. 
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So, what can the microfinance experience teach the impact 
investing market more generally about dispute resolution? One 
obvious lesson from these microfinance debt workouts, which may 
hold true for other types of troubled impact investments, is that an 
impact investor’s commitment to achieving both a financial and a 
social return will be tested when an impact investment begins to 
underperform financially. It is likely that financial considerations 
ultimately will guide investors’ responses—even more socially-
motivated investors.
66
 Furthermore, the wide variety of investors 
attracted to impact investing can slow and complicate the resolution 
of a troubled impact investment, should a workout become necessary. 
Coordinating investors likely will become still more challenging 
when the multiple investors that are party to a dispute have opted for 
different mechanisms to resolve disputes, and, in some cases, have 
chosen the laws of different jurisdictions to govern their investment 
documentation. 
If this microfinance experience is indicative of how other disputes 
might play out in impact investing, investors are likely, at least 
initially, to attempt to resolve impact investment disputes on a 
consensual and informal basis outside of more formal mechanisms. 
Furthermore, given that so much of impact investing today is in the 
form of debt investments, debt workouts likely will be accomplished 
through the establishment of intercreditor committees, and ex post 
intercreditor agreements or standstill agreements. 
 
 A third product was the creation of a debt restructuring menu of options, outlining various 
alternatives available to investors to encourage lender participation in voluntary debt workouts. 
See id. app. 6, at 32.  
 The last product was a Microfinance Loan Covenant Review. To complete this review, 
students in the ITC researched loan agreements in commercial and microfinance contexts and 
reviewed, confidentially, two mainstream and four microfinance loan agreements. The review 
identified covenants that lenders might incorporate into their future loan documentation to 
microfinance institutions to further mitigate risk, such as restrictions on the borrower’s ability 
to make distributions to shareholders; restrictions on consolidations and mergers; insurance 
coverage requirements; and compliance with anti-corruption, anti-terrorism and anti-money 
laundering laws. The review also identified variations in definitions and calculation methods of 
common covenant items that could benefit from harmonization in the future. See id. app. 7, at 
33–39.  
 66. See, e.g., INTERNAT’L ASSOC. OF MICROFIN. INVESTORS, supra note 48, at 7 
(quoting a microfinance investor who noted that “All of us want to get our money back. This is 
no different from the ‘world.’”). 
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Finally, it is likely that the contractual provisions currently 
included in impact investment documentation will shift in content 
and grow in importance as the impact investment market gains more 
experience dealing with conflicts that may arise from these 
investments. One other likely result is that some of the complexity 
being built into the structures of impact investments may give way to 
simpler transactions—particularly for low-value transactions where 
the cost of enforcing a complex payment provision or complex deal 
structure threatens to overwhelm the amounts in dispute.  
V. HOW ARE IMPACT INVESTMENTS PLANNING TO RESOLVE 
DISPUTES? WHAT CONSIDERATIONS ARE RELEVANT? HOW CAN WE 
CREATE MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES 
ARISING FROM IMPACT INVESTMENTS GONE BAD? 
Impact investors appear to be taking a variety of approaches to 
mitigate or avoid the possible risks of impact investing. In many 
cases, the most effective and practical approach to managing these 
risks may be to look beyond the four corners of the investment 
documentation. Yet, the underlying investment documentation still 
will need to include some form of dispute resolution mechanism. 
Furthermore, while investors and investees may not be inclined to ask 
(or pay) their lawyers to tailor dispute resolution provisions to the 
idiosyncrasies that shape their particular impact investment 
transactions, the act of merely dropping boilerplate dispute provisions 
from commercially-oriented agreements into impact investment 
agreements is hardly appropriate—particularly in impact investments 
where great care has been taken to introduce novel structures or terms 
to reflect the transacting parties’ social motivations. 
Given the nascent stage of impact investing, the current body of 
research about which dispute resolution processes are most 
appropriate for particular types of disputes has not yet extended to 
disputes arising out of impact investments, especially disputes arising 
out of the social impact goals of the investment. To the extent that 
impact investment disputes arise from social mission-oriented 
expectations, it is worth considering, even if just hypothetically, 
which dispute resolution mechanisms are most appropriate to respond 
to such disputes and to explore what modifications or improvements 
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could be made to enhance the effectiveness of these mechanisms 
when applied to impact investments. 
Arbitration is currently the preferred method of resolving 
international commercial disputes.
67
 As such, it should not be 
surprising that many impact investors also opt to resolve cross-border 
investment disputes through international arbitration.
68
 In part, 
impact investors’ preference for arbitration may be due to the fact 
that most impact investments are taking place in emerging markets, 
where the efficiency and impartiality of judicial systems may be 
viewed with skepticism by foreign investors.
69
 In the commercial 
context, however, international arbitration is not only preferred by 
those who worry that the opposing party is coming from a country 
with an inefficient or unreliable judicial system. Often, international 
arbitration is favored over litigation by parties seeking a quicker, 
more private proceeding that is subject to more limited discovery 
rules. Alternatively, the parties may want to ensure that the dispute is 
presided over by a specialist who is knowledgeable in the field from 
which the dispute arises.
70
 Another important benefit of international 
 
 67. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 94 (2d ed. 
2014); see also S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of 
International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 11–12, 27 (2014). 
 68. In 2012–2013, a legal working group of in-house lawyers for impact investors and 
social enterprises from the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) noted the 
growing use of arbitration clauses in impact investment documentation and asked the ITC to 
create a guide for drafting arbitration clauses for cross-border investment transactions in social 
enterprises. See DEBORAH BURAND, WHITNEY SCHNEIDER—WHITE & JAY SPRINGER, ASPEN 
NETWORK OF DEV. ENTREPRENEURS, Guide to Drafting Arbitration Clauses for Cross-Border 
Investment Transactions in Social Enterprises: Annotated Model Arbitration Clause and 
Annotated Model Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution Clause 5 (2013) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter ANDE Arbitration Guide]. 
 69. In many developing countries, even if there is a functioning and reputable judicial 
branch, courts may experience significant backlogs, which can add to lengthy delays in 
resolving disputes. For example, one commentator has noted that there are “habitual delays of 
up to 15 years” in litigating commercial disputes in India. Ramon Gosh, Commercial Disputes 
in India, Vol 9, Issue 3. Investigative Intelligence (2011), available at http://www.kroll.com/ 
media/pdf/articles/Asian-Mena_Counsel_Ramon_Ghosh_May2011.pdf; see also India—Doing 
business in, Chambers & Partners Legal Practice Guide, Litigation 2014–2015, available at 
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/guide/practice-guides/location/241/6600/1028-0.  
 70. See generally WHITE & CASE & QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, 2010 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2–3 
(2010) (stating that arbitration is widely used to resolve international disputes because of its 
flexibility). Parties can choose governing law, place of arbitration, arbitration institution (if 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/9
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arbitration is the relatively easy enforcement of arbitral awards as a 
result of international treaties created to promote the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.
71
 
Presumably, impact investors (and, possibly, their investees) share 
similar perceptions of the advantages of arbitration for resolving 
disputes arising in cross-border impact investments. But is arbitration 
well suited for resolving disputes between an impact investor and its 
investee, or among impact investors that have co-invested in the same 
investee? Put differently, are the perceived benefits of arbitration 
likely to be realized in an impact investment dispute?  
For the purpose of this analysis, this Article focuses on four 
considerations that are likely to be important when fashioning an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism for impact investing: 
(1) knowledge/skills of decision-makers charged with resolving 
the dispute; 
(2) speed of proceedings; 
(3) adversarial/private nature of proceedings; and  
(4) cost of proceedings.  
A. Knowledge/Skills of Decision-Makers 
One perceived benefit of arbitration is that parties can control who 
will resolve their dispute. In theory, parties can pick an arbitrator who 
understands their business goals, and the context in which the dispute 
arises, yet is also impartial.
72
 On the face of it, this sounds like a 
 
used), and arbitrators, among others. See also William S. Fiske, Should Small and Medium-Size 
American Businesses “Going Global” Use International Commercial Arbitration?, 18 
TRANSNAT’L LAW 455, 481 (2005) (“Before opting out of litigation and, instead, into 
arbitration, American-based transborder businesses should consider three simple variables: (a) 
the nature of the transaction at issue; (b) the legal tradition of their trade partner’s country; and 
(c) the local judiciary’s expertise with the relevant commercial issue”).  
 71. Strong, supra note 67, at 27–28. 
 72. Susan D. Franck, A Survival Guide for Small Businesses: Avoiding the Pitfalls in 
International Dispute Resolution, 3 MINN. J. BUS. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 19, 28 (2004). 
Franck points out that it may be at the negotiation stage to gauge what disputes, if any, will 
arise in connection with the transaction. Id. She notes that parties may be better situated looking 
for an arbitrator with a helpful background after a dispute arises and facts/issues have 
crystallized. Id. She also cautions against defining too narrowly the required attributes of an 
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good idea for impact investment disputes too, particularly given the 
very limited experience that sitting judges (and possibly juries) may 
have in considering impact investment disputes. In today’s world, 
however, where are the arbitrators who are skilled and 
knowledgeable about social enterprises and impact investing?  
A lack of arbitrator expertise in impact investing raises the 
likelihood of unpredictable dispute resolution processes and 
outcomes, which in turn can significantly undermine investor 
confidence. As a result, new investors may delay their entry into, or 
existing investors may hasten their exit from, the impact investing 
market. Accordingly, unless initiatives are launched to develop 
impact investment arbitrators or to educate existing arbitrators about 
the distinguishing features of impact investing, today’s arbitrators are 
no more likely to bring specialized knowledge to impact investing 
than their judicial counterparts.  
One possible solution is to establish arbitral tribunals that use 
arbitrators with specialized expertise in impact investing.
73
 While the 
idea of creating an “impact investing tribunal” could be useful in the 
future as the impact investing market matures and deal flows 
increase, the establishment of a niche tribunal for the impact 
investing market does not adequately solve today’s problem—
namely, the current lack of arbitrators who are knowledgeable about 
impact investing. Happily, however, the answer to that problem just 
might reside in the impact investing market itself.  
Currently, the world of international arbitrators is populated for 
the most part by lawyers and judges, but that has not always been the 
case.
74
 There is no legal requirement that arbitrators must be 
 
arbitrator, as overly “prescribing attributes for arbitrators at the contractual stage does a 
disservice to a business’ commercial objective to have a flexible and enforceable dispute 
resolution mechanism.” Id. 
 73. See Fiske, supra note 70, at 477–78 (describing, for example, the emergence of niche 
arbitral tribunals, such as the American Arbitration Association’s E-Commerce Dispute 
Management Protocol, which is technology focused dispute resolution service for b2b internet 
transactions; the Grain and Feed Trade Association’s arbitrations for commercial disputes over 
sales of grain and herds; and the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO’s) 
arbitrations focusing on domain name dispute resolution). 
 74. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current 
Practices and Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators 43–44 (Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2014/30, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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members of the bar.
75
 One possible solution to the lack of qualified 
arbitrators with impact investment experience is to seek potential 
arbitrators from within the growing ranks of impact investing 
professionals.  
Another, perhaps more practical, approach is to introduce expert 
testimony from impact investing professionals in arbitration. Indeed, 
some commentators argue that, given that arbitration’s evidentiary 
rules and discovery requirements are less onerous than those found in 
litigation, arbitration is better suited than litigation to using expert 
evidence effectively.
76
 Dispute panels involving experts from various 
disciplines have long been used in construction and 
securities/brokerage disputes.
77
 There is no reason why impact 
investing should not do so too. Furthermore, impact-investing experts 
may be particularly useful in helping arbitrators craft appropriate 
remedies for an impact investment dispute. This may be particularly 
true where the issue at stake is not purely monetary. 
B. Speed of Proceedings 
Speed is another reason that parties sometimes choose arbitration. 
In the resource-constrained world of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, a fast decision or resolution of a dispute often is valued 
more highly than a favorable outcome.
78
 The rapid resolution of 
disputes may be critical to keep fundamentally strong impact 
investments on track toward achieving their financial and social 
objectives, and also to build and maintain the confidence of new and 
existing impact investors, so they will be inclined to make additional 
 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519196 (citing antecedents of modern arbitration practice, which 
included merchant and professional guilds to resolve disputes of their members). 
 75. Id. at 10. 
 76. See George Ruttinger & Joe Meadows, Using Experts in Arbitration, 62 DISP. RESOL. 
J. 46, 47–48 (2007) (stating that arbitration offers more opportunities for using and presenting 
expert testimony than litigation). 
 77. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 74, at 44.  
 78. According to a survey of small and medium enterprise (SME) respondents, the top 
requirement of a dispute resolution mechanism was speed; the second ranked requirement was a 
favorable outcome. See ROB VAN DER HORST, RENATE DE VREE, & PAUL VAN DER ZEIJDEN, 
EIM BUSINESS & POLICY RESEARCH, SME ACCESS TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SYSTEMS 67 (2006).  
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impact investments. Unfortunately, in practice, arbitration is not 
always faster than litigation.
79
  
On the other hand, steps are being taken to establish expedited or 
fast track procedures for commercial arbitration.
80
 According to a 
recent survey of arbitrators, expedited procedures are most likely to 
be used in commercial arbitrations with relatively low-value amounts 
in dispute.
81
 Given that most impact investments are also relatively 
small,
82
 use of expedited or fast track procedures may be necessary to 
increase the efficiency of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism for impact investment disputes.  
 
 79. Strong, supra note 6758, at 26 (internal citations omitted) (noting current discontent 
with international arbitration arising from perception that arbitral processes have become “too 
slow, expensive and legalistic”).  
 80. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, INTERNATIONAL EXPEDITED PROCEDURES 8 (2014).  
 81. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 74, at 39 (Chart FF). In a survey of arbitrators’ 
experience with streamlined or fast track arbitration procedures, Stipanowich and Ulrich found 
that fast track procedures in arbitration were used most prevalently in low value disputes. In 
response to the question, “have you served as an arbitrator in a case under streamlined or fast 
track procedures involving disputes” of certain dollar amounts, survey respondents answered 
“yes” at the following rates: 
 Under $100,000: 88 percent  
 From $100,000 to $499,000: 43 percent  
 From $500,000 to $999,000, 21 percent 
 From $1 million to $4.99 million: 17 percent responded yes 
 From $5 million to $9.99 million: 2 percent 
 From $10 million to $49.9 million, 2 percent  
 $50 million or more: 2 percent 
Id. 
 82. See supra note 14.  
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C. Adversarial/Private Nature of Proceedings 
Parties sometimes choose arbitration over litigation because of the 
perception that litigation is more polarizing and can cause already 
challenged relationships among the parties to deteriorate further, 
particularly if grievances are aired in a public courtroom. At first 
blush, a less polarizing, dispute resolution mechanism than litigation 
sounds like a good idea for impact investment disputes too, 
particularly given that so much of impact investing is based on 
aligning the values and return expectations of investors and investees. 
But is arbitration any friendlier than litigation? And, perhaps even 
more important, is the privacy afforded most arbitral decisions 
healthy for the impact investing market?  
One can argue that the impact investing market needs its missteps 
to be widely shared so that the learnings gleaned from those missteps 
can prevent others from making the same mistakes.
83
 Moreover, 
important public policy consequences may arise from a failed impact 
investment. To resolve such disputes in secret could have damaging 
implications that go far beyond the impact investing market, 
particularly when impact investment transactions are grounded in 
private/public partnerships to address a thorny societal problem.
84
 
Accordingly, parties considering impact investment arbitration may 
decide that it is not only in the impact investing market’s broader 
interest to forego the confidentiality that often accompanies 
commercial arbitration, but that it also is in the broader societal 
interest to bring their impact investment dispute proceedings out into 
 
 83. For example, Jeffrey Liebman points to the need for “high value learning” to emerge 
from the experimentation taking place with social impact bond structures so that lessons from 
these transactions can be shared broadly and quickly with others putting together new deals. 
JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS “SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A 
PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE” 20 (2011). 
 84. Social impact bonds and other government-sponsored “pay for success” financings are 
examples of impact investments that deliberately align private and public interests in a financial 
transaction. See generally Center for American Progress Fact Sheet: Social Impact Bonds, 
CNTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
economy/report/2014/02/12/84003/fact-sheet-social-impact-bonds-in-the-united-states/. 
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the open.
85
 This is most likely to be relevant for those impact 
investments where significant public policy considerations are at 
stake.  
D. Costs of Proceedings 
Even if knowledgeable arbitrators can speedily reach decisions in 
the international arbitration of impact investment disputes, while 
preserving some semblance of amicable and transparent proceedings, 
costs remain a problem. In short, the costs involved in arbitrating an 
impact investment dispute may overwhelm the sums in question.
86
 
Managing costs in dispute resolution is not a problem unique to 
impact investments, of course. Small and medium enterprises have 
 
 85. The idea of opening arbitration proceedings to the public when public interests are 
involved is not as radical as it might first appear. A significant step was taken recently in this 
regard by the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) in 2013, which 
adopted a set of rules aimed at opening these types of dispute proceedings to the public (the 
“Transparency Rules”). UNITED NATIONALS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, 6 
(2014), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/ 
Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf. The Transparency Rules came into effect on April 1, 2014. 
TRANSPARENCY REGISTRY (A REPOSITORY FOR THE PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION AND 
DOCUMENTS IN TREATY BASED INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION), Introduction, UNICITRAL 
(2015), http://www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/en/introduction.html. 
 Subsequently, the Mauritius Convention on Transparency was adopted to ensure 
application of the Transparency Rules among ratifying governments. The Mauritius Convention 
on Transparency opened for signature on March 17, 2015. UNIS (United Nations Information 
Service) Press Release, March 17, 2015, “Signing Ceremony for the United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration”, available at 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2015/unisl214.html. This transparency initiative 
was fuelled by the view that these disputes are likely to involve issues of public interest and 
uses of taxpayer funds such that confidentiality concerns of the disputing parties should be 
balanced against the public interests at stake. See generally FAQ—UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, “What is the purpose of the Rules on 
Transparency?”, UNCITRAL (2014), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_ 
texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_FAQ.html#purpose. 
 Related, another potentially useful tool is to create a form of registry for publication of 
information relevant to impact investment arbitration awards that involve significant public 
policy considerations and actors. See, e.g., id.  
 86. While the average size of an impact investment transaction in 2013 was approximately 
$2 million, impact investment transactions vary in size from thousands of dollars to several 
millions of dollars. See supra note 14, describing the size of capital flows and number of impact 
investments made with that capital in 2013.  
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long faced problems of cost when turning to arbitration to resolve 
cross-border disputes.
87
  
One possible cost-saving response is to reconsider the type of 
legal fee arrangements that are most appropriate for impact 
investment disputes. How might alternative fee arrangements be 
structured? Should model agreements or templates be created to 
demonstrate alternative fee arrangements for impact investment 
disputes? When, if ever, should pro bono or low bono arrangements 
be encouraged?  
Arbitrators willing to provide pro bono services do exist, but they 
are rare and more willing to forego fees when disputes involve 
individuals, rather than companies.
88
 On the other hand, most law 
firms have been unwilling, to date, to take on international 
arbitrations at a reduced fee.
89
 In contrast, law school-sponsored 
clinics may be uniquely situated to provide representation to parties 
involved in an impact investment dispute, particularly given the 
social justice and/or economic development motivations that 
underpin many impact investment transactions.
90
 Just as student 
attorneys in the International Transactions Clinic (ITC) now represent 
investors and investees in the creation of impact investments, student 
attorneys could also represent such clients in impact investment 
disputes that are of such low value that the private bar is uninterested 
in representing the disputing parties. Rethinking fee arrangements 
might be particularly appropriate in those disputes that arise when the 
impact investor and the investee have agreed to forego some amount 
of financial return in order to advance social impact goals. This is one 
place where the lawyers involved in a dispute may want to consider 
 
 87. See Horst et al., supra note 78, at 67 tbl.41 (among desired requirements of dispute 
resolution mechanism, low price was ranked as third highest requirement by small enterprises 
with fifty or fewer employees).  
 88. See Burand et al., supra note 68, at 7.  
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of 
Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 29 (Columbia American 
Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, 2014; Pepperdine University Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2014/29, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519084) (describing 
growing interest in mediation-oriented law clinics in US law schools).  
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whether their values align well with those of their clients, such that 
the lawyers might provide their services at reduced rates.  
Another cost-saving strategy is to select a location for the 
arbitration proceedings that is not unduly expensive for the parties. 
This approach may push parties to opt for local or regional arbitral 
institutions that are closer to the location of the investment. Or, 
alternatively, where the dispute involves parties from different 
jurisdictions, the parties may consider using technology-enabled, 
dispute resolution processes to reduce the expense of face-to-face 
proceedings.
91
  
Perhaps the largest cost-saving strategy is to resolve impact 
investment parties’ concerns before they ripen into a full-blown 
dispute. Accordingly, parties to an impact investment might include 
in their investment documentation a pre-arranged, routine mechanism 
for communicating about concerns that may arise in the course of the 
investment.
92
  
Parties also may want to including “stepped” dispute resolution 
clauses into their impact investment documentation.
93
 A multi-tiered 
 
 91. See, e.g., ICDR Manufacturer/Supplier Online Dispute Resolution Protocol 
(MSODR), INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2015), https://www.icdr.org/ 
icdr/faces/icdrservices/msodr; see also Bette J. Roth, Randall W. Wulff & Charles A. Cooper, 
ADR Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 2 ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. 
PRAC. GUIDE APPENDIX II-25, (2006) (noting that in some countries, e-mediation or online 
dispute resolution has introduced a promising way to resolve disputes for small and medium-
sized enterprises). 
 92. This is a feature seen in dispute boards that are used in infrastructure project 
financings. See Cyril Chern & Patricia O. Sulser, Keeping Public-Private Partnership 
Infrastructure Projects on Track: The Power of Multistakeholder Partnering Committees and 
Dispute Boards in Emerging-Market Infrastructure Projects, 5 THE WORLD BANK L. REV. 21, 
36 (2013) (describing use of dispute boards in project financings used by the International 
Finance Corporation). Another feature of dispute boards that could prove useful in the impact 
investment context is dispute boards’ ability to promote an inclusion agenda, allowing the 
dispute board to go beyond hearing evidence from the contracting parties to take into 
consideration, for example, the voices of affected community members. Id.  
 93. Parties always can informally agree to pursue negotiation or mediation. However, 
there may be some value in expressly stating this expectation at the beginning of the investment 
relationship and memorializing it in the investment documentation. While there is a risk that 
parties might take advantage of such provisions, even stall for time to prepare for the eventual 
arbitration or litigation, this risk can be addressed by including time limits for the negotiation 
and/or mediation period, after which either party can escalate the dispute and turn to a more 
formal dispute resolution proceeding such as arbitration or litigation.  
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or stepped approach requires that the parties engage in negotiation
94
 
or mediation
95
 before they turn to arbitration or litigation to resolve 
disputes. Mediation, in particular, may be useful to impact 
investments as mediation’s more informal and consensus-based 
procedures can help preserve the parties’ relationship beyond the 
dispute at hand.
96
  
CONCLUSION 
Impact investments are experimenting with novel deal structures, 
unusual contractual terms, and untested legal forms of entities—all 
against the challenging backdrop of conducting cross-border 
transactions in countries where judicial efficiency and impartiality 
may be uncertain. This combination of transactional novelty and legal 
uncertainty presents a dilemma for those who hope to see the impact 
investment market continue to grow.  
To date, much of the attention on impact investing has focused on 
increasing the deal flow of these impact investment transactions. Yet, 
if impact investing is to grow into a robust and resilient asset class, 
attention must also focus on developing effective mechanisms for 
resolving disputes that will inevitably arise when impact investments 
fail to meet investor expectations. Consequently, emphasis should be 
given to building an ecosystem for dispute resolution that best serves 
the impact investment market.  
 
 94. Negotiation as used here means taking attempts to resolve a dispute to higher-level 
decision-makers (upper management) within the disputing parties’ organizations.  
 95. Mediation as used here means a form of “supervised” negotiation where higher-level 
decision-makers are in charge of resolving the dispute but they are doing this under the 
supervision of a neutral third-party, the mediator. Mediation is generally not binding on its own, 
but parties can agree to memorialize in writing a mediated solution. See generally, Edna 
Sussman & Conna A. Weiner, Striving for the ‘Bullet-Proof’ Mediation Settlement Agreement, 
8 NYSBA New York Dispute Resolution Lawyer 22 (Spring 2015) at 25, available at  
http://sussmanadr.com/docs/Bullet%20Proofing%20the%20mediation%20agreement%20NYS
BA%20Spring%2015.pdf (noting that many mediations conclude with only oral agreements, 
the authors recommend recording the settlement agreement in writing). 
 96. See Strong, supra note 67, at 25–26 (observes that consensus-based procedures [as can 
be found in mediation] offer advantages such as preservation of ongoing relationships, and that 
“value- or structure-based disputes may derive particular benefits from mediation” as opposed 
to disputes that “focus primarily on monetary concerns”).  
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This Article suggests that, while the international nature of most 
impact investments makes international arbitration a more likely 
choice for dispute resolution than litigation, more work must be done 
to make international arbitration an efficient and effective dispute 
resolution mechanism for impact investment disputes. To start, a 
cadre of arbitrators that understand impact investing should be 
developed, both to increase the speed with which arbitral decisions 
are reached and to reduce the costs of arbitration. Furthermore, if 
arbitration continues to be the preferred mechanism for resolving 
impact investment disputes, appropriate transparency must be 
brought to these proceedings and their resulting decisions so market 
players can learn from each other’s mistakes. Similarly, increased 
transparency may be required in those arbitral proceedings where the 
disputed impact investment raises significant public policy 
considerations.  
In the meantime, those drafting dispute resolution provisions for 
impact investment documentation may want to consider including 
pre-arranged, routine processes for addressing concerns that may 
arise in the course of the investment so as to avoid the need for 
implementing a dispute resolution mechanism in the first place. 
Drafters of impact investment documentation should also consider 
including a stepped dispute mechanism that directs parties to 
negotiation and mediation before resorting to international 
arbitration. 
In order to advance this discussion, more thorough research 
should be done regarding the actual practices of impact investors 
when confronting weak or failing impact investments, and a larger 
data set of impact investment documentation must be examined to 
ascertain what contractual provisions are typically included in impact 
investment documentation to address disputes. The challenge with 
this proposal, of course, is that some impact investment market 
advocates may worry that frank discussions about the likelihood of 
failed impact investments will dampen the enthusiasm of new 
entrants to the impact investment market. While that concern is valid, 
the alternative is far worse; only a few flashy failures may be enough 
to start a drumbeat of criticisms sounded by skeptics eager to claim 
that the impact investment market is just smoke and mirrors. The 
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distrust and suspicion that follows such claims may do irreparable 
damage to this nascent market.  
If impact investing truly is to mature into the “revolution,” 
“invisible heart of markets,” and “ground zero of a big deal” that its 
proponents claim, work must start now to ensure that the dispute 
resolution mechanisms introduced into impact investments are just as 
innovative and value-aligned as the deal structures attracting 
investors willing to invest billions, and possibly trillions, of dollars 
into this new market.  
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